Abstract.-In a series of articles, Rieppel (2005, Biol. Philos. 20:465-487; 2006a, Cladistics 22:186-197; 2006b, Systematist 26:5-9), Keller et al. (2003, Bot. Rev. 69:93-110), and Nixon and Carpenter (2000, Cladistics 16:298-318) criticize the philosophical foundations of the PhyloCode. They argue that species and higher taxa are not individuals, and they reject the view that taxon names are rigid designators. Furthermore, they charge supporters of the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory with assuming essentialism, committing logical inconsistencies, and offering proposals that render taxonomy untestable. These charges are unsound. Such charges turn on confusions over rigid designator theory and the distinction between kinds and individuals. In addition, Rieppel's, Keller et al.'s, and Nixon and Carpenter's proposed alternatives are no better and have their own problems. The individuality thesis and rigid designator theory should not be quickly abandoned.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Ghiselin (1966 Ghiselin ( , 1974 and Hull (1976 Hull ( , 1978 wrote a series of articles suggesting that species and higher taxa are individuals and that taxon names are rigid designators. Many systematists adopted Ghiselin and Hull's suggestions (Eldridge, 1985; Cracraft, 1987; Ridley, 1989) . Not everyone joined the individuality camp (Farris, 1985; Ruse, 1987) . In a series of recent articles, Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( ,2006a Rieppel ( , 2006b ) rejects the individuality thesis and its associated rigid designator theory. He argues that taxa are not individuals but kinds, and he maintains that taxon names are not rigid designators. In his articles, Rieppel addresses no less than the philosophical foundations of taxonomy and nomenclature. However, his intended target is the PhyloCode (Cantino and de Queiroz, 2006) , for he sees the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory as part of the philosophical foundation of the PhyloCode. Many of Rieppel's arguments are drawn from earlier works by Nixon and Carpenter (2000) and Keller et al. (2003) . Their goal is similar to Rieppel's. They attempt to undermine the PhyloCode by rejecting the individuality thesis or expressing doubts over application of rigid designator theory to biological nomenclature. This paper does not argue for or against adopting the PhyloCode. Instead it focuses on the foundational issues raised by Rieppel and others. Should we reject the thesis that taxa are individuals and return to an earlier conception of taxa as kinds, as suggested by Rieppel and others? Should we reject the idea that taxon names are rigid designators? The arguments of this paper suggest that the answer to both questions is 'no.' In particular, this paper defends the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory from Rieppel's, Nixon and Carpenter's, and Keller et al.' s criticisms.
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF TAXA
Before examining Rieppel's (2005 Rieppel's ( , 2006a Rieppel's ( , 2006b ) and Keller et al.'s (2003) arguments that taxa are kinds and not individuals, let us review the background to this debate. The traditional account of kinds, dating back to Aristotle, assumes that the members of a kind share a common and unique essence. A kind's essence consists of one or more essential properties. Those properties are qualitative or intrinsic properties of organisms, not relational properties among organisms. In the last 50 years, many philosophers and biologists have argued that species are not kinds with essences (Hull, 1965; Ghiselin, 1974; Mayr, 1976; Sober, 1980) . They offer a number of arguments against species essentialism. A simple and classic one concerns the "all and only" requirement of essentialism. Species essentialism requires the occurrence of one or more essential properties in all the members of a species for the entire life of that species. Furthermore, it requires that those essential properties occur in only the members of that species for the entire existence of life on Earth. Many biologists and philosophers are skeptical that this all and only requirement will be satisfied by all species, let alone by any species, given the forces of evolution (Ereshefsky, 2001) . Such forces as mutation and recombination work against the occurrence of a biological trait in all the members of a species. Moreover, organisms in related species inherit common genetic and developmental resources, causing the members of different species to share similarities. Given the stringent requirements of essentialism and the confounding forces of evolution, species essentialism is no longer a viable systematic philosophy.
If species are not essentialist kinds, what is their ontological status? In the 1960s and 1970s Ghiselin (1966 Ghiselin ( , 1974 and Hull (1976 Hull ( ,1978 wrote a series of articles codifying the view that species and higher taxa are individuals. Ghiselin and Hull draw the distinction between kinds and individuals along the lines of spatiotemporal restrictedness. Kinds are spatiotemporally unrestricted entities. A chunk of metal is a member of the kind copper so long as it has the essential atomic weight of copper, regardless of its location in space and time. Individuals, on the other hand, are spatiotemporally restricted entities. Consider the following contrast. Chemistry describes various kinds of metal (copper, lead, and so on) and individual chunks of metal (the copper coin in my pocket). Copper, the kind, can have members across the universe, but the parts of the copper coin in my pocket must be located in a restricted space-time region to be parts of that chunk of metal. There are more stringent 296 SYSTEMATIC BIOLOGY VOL. 56 requirements on individuality in the literature; for example, the requirement that the parts of an individual must be spatiotemporally restricted and continually interacting (Ereshefsky, 2001 ). Hull and Ghiselin's requirement for individuality, however, is the minimal one of spatiotemporal restrictedness.
Ghiselin and Hull's argument that species are spatiotemporally restricted entities turns on the assumption that species are genealogical entities. All the organisms in a species are connected by heredity relations-they are offspring of conspecifks, or parents of conspecifics, or both. Reproductive relations require that organisms, or their parts (DNA, gametes), come into contact. Such contact requires that parent and offspring, or their appropriate parts, be connected in space and time. Though not every member of a species must come in contact with every other member, they all must be connected to the same genealogical nexus. The members of a species, in other words, must form a spatiotemporally continuous entity. Hence, species are individuals. The same reasoning applies to higher taxa. The parts of a higher taxa, their less inclusive taxa, must be genealogically connected and occupy a particular space-time region. Therefore, higher taxa are individuals.
Here is where Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( ,2006a Rieppel ( , 2006b ) and Keller et al.'s (2003) Boyd's (1999a Boyd's ( , 1999b homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory of kinds, and argue that taxa should be considered HPC kinds. Rieppel and Keller et al. are not alone in claiming that taxa are HPC kinds (see Boyd, 1999a; Griffiths, 1999; Wilson, 1999) . According to HPC theory, kinds are groups of entities that share stable similarities. HPC theory does not require that kinds have traditional essential properties. Nevertheless, the similarities among the members of an HPC kind must be stable enough to allow for successful induction. That is, they must be stable enough to allow us to predict with better than chance probability that a member of an HPC kind will have certain properties. HPC kinds are more than groups of entities that share stable clusters of similarities. HPC kinds also contain "homeostatic causal mechanisms" that are responsible for the similarities found among the members of a kind. Such homeostatic mechanisms include interbreeding, selection factors, developmental constraints, and common inheritance. Boyd writes that species are HPC kinds because "species are defined ...by ...shared properties and by the mechanisms (including both 'external' mechanisms and genetic transmission) which sustain their homeostasis" (1999b:81). Boyd (1999a) argues that higher taxa are HPC kinds as well. Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( , 2006a and Keller et al. (2003) concur that species and higher taxa are HPC kinds.
HPC theory provides a more promising account of species and higher taxa than essentialism. HPC kinds need not have traditional essential properties, so the standard criticisms of species essentialism are avoided. Furthermore, HPC theory allows that extrinsic relations play a significant role in explaining similarity among the members of a kind. Essentialism assumes that the essence of a kind is an intrinsic property of a kind's members, such as the atomic structure of gold or the DNA of tigers. HPC theory recognizes that both the intrinsic properties of organisms and the extrinsic relations among organisms cause intraspecific similarities. For example, HPC theory but not essentialism cites interbreeding as a cause of similarity among the organisms of a species.
Given the virtues of HPC theory, should we adopt the view, advocated by Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( ,2006a Rieppel ( , 2006b ) and Keller et al. (2003) and others, that species and higher taxa are HPC kinds? There are considerable problems with treating taxa as HPC kinds. Consider an underlying motivation for HPC theory. The world contains many groups of entities with similar properties. HPC theory aims to give an account of such similarity clusters. This is an important project, and there may be many HPC kinds in the world, but taxa are not among them. HPC's emphasis on similarity is at odds with phylogenetic approaches to taxonomy. HPC kinds are fundamentally similarity classes, whereas taxa are fundamentally genealogical entities. Taxa, as we shall see, are not HPC kinds.
In his discussion of whether higher taxa are HPC kinds, Boyd considers whether there can be nonmonophyletic taxa (1999a :180ff.). He asks if a paraphyletic taxon whose members are roughly similar due to similar homeostatic mechanisms is an HPC kind. His answer is 'yes. ' Boyd (1999a:182) writes: "If there are higher taxa that are real in this way, it is important to note that there is no particular reason to believe that their homeostatic property cluster definitions will honor strict monophyly.... Thus, even if a requirement of strict monophyly is appropriate for some higher taxa, it need not be so for [the] taxa in question." So taxa as HPC kinds can be paraphyletic. This should not rest easily with those who believe that higher taxa must be monophyletic nor with those that believe that species should be monophyletic.
Boyd also allows that taxa as HPC kinds can be polyphyletic. Boyd (1999a:80) discusses a "species" that arises through multiple hybridization events. Boyd characterizes this species as consisting of "distinct lineages" that have "commonalities in evolutionary tendencies " (1999a:80) . This species contains members with various phenotypic and genotypic similarities, yet the species is merely a collection of spatiotemporally disconnected lineages. This species, in other words, is not a single genealogical entity. Concerning this case, Boyd concludes "I do not for better or worse, hold that HPC kinds are defined by reference to historical relations among members, rather than by reference to shared properties" (1999a:80). For Boyd, similarity trumps historical connectedness. Boyd's preference for similarity-based kinds allows species and higher taxa to be polyphyletic. Moreover, it allows taxa to be nongenealogical and hence nonhistorical entities. HPC theory is a vast improvement over essentialism. It does not attribute essential traits to taxa. Furthermore, it allows that such relations as interbreeding, genealogy and frequency-dependent selection are mechanisms that cause similarities among the organisms of a species. However, HPC theory is not historical enough to provide a proper account of species and higher taxa. The root of the problem is that HPC theory is in the business of establishing classes of similar organisms, whereas species and higher taxa are historical entities. History in HPC theory may play a role in explaining similarity (for example, that inherited genetic and developmental resources contribute to phenotypic similarity), but HPC kinds need not be historical entities. Notice the depth of the problem of applying HPC theory to species and higher taxa. The problem is not merely that HPC theory allows taxa to be paraphyletic or polyphyletic, but that HPC theory allows taxa to be nonhistorical entities.
Let us turn to Rieppel and Keller et al.' s criticism of the individuality thesis. Supporters of the individuality thesis deny that taxa have qualitative essences. However, Keller et al. (2003) and Rieppel (2006a) argue that the individuality thesis entails a commitment to essentialism. On the individuality thesis, taxa have unique evolutionary origins. A monophyletic taxon, for example, consists of all and only the descendents of a common and unique ancestor. Consequently, all the members of a monophyletic taxon have a common and unique ancestor. Rieppel calls this "origin essentialism " (1996a:191) . According to Rieppel and Keller et al., the individuality thesis assumes rather than avoids essentialism. Thus, Rieppel charges that the individuality thesis and its associated rigid designator theory of taxon names are "wedded to essentialism" (2006a:191) . Later he writes that supporters of the individuality thesis are "caught in essentialism" (Rieppel, 2006a: 196) . Similarly, Keller et al. charge supporters of the individuality thesis with committing "major logical inconsistencies " (2003:99) . We will get to the semantics of taxon names in the next section, but first let us consider the charge that the individuality thesis assumes essentialism.
Rieppel and Keller et al.'s argument trades on an equivocation over the word "essentialism." Two types of essentialism are being discussed, qualitative essentialism and origin essentialism (de Queiroz, 1992) . Qualitative essentialism assumes that the members of a kind share a qualitative essence-a character that makes no reference to a particular time or place. Such characters are intrinsic properties of organisms. Origin essentialism asserts that the members of a taxon have a common and unique phylogenetic origin. Such essences are relations among organisms. According to origin essentialism, membership in a taxon depends on being a descendent of a particular ancestor. The difference between qualitative essentialism and origin essentialism is the difference between kinds and individuals as articulated by Ghiselin and Hull. For instance, Hull (1976:187) writes, "[Tlhe individual-class distinction used in this paper hinges on distinguishing spatiotemporal properties from all other properties." All members of Diapsida share the spatiotemporal property of being properly related to a common and unique ancestor, whereas all chunks of gold have the qualitative property of having a certain atomic weight. When Rieppel and Keller et al. charge supporters of the individuality thesis of essentialism they conflate origin essentialism and qualitative essentialism. As a result, Rieppel and Keller et al. conflate the distinction between individuals and kinds. Individuals and kinds are two different types of ontological categories, and those categories are accompanied by different approaches to scientific explanation and taxonomy. Conflating the two rides roughshod over two distinct scientific practices.
Consider the central ontological difference between individuals and kinds. Being a part of a particular individual requires having the proper causal relations to the other parts of that individual. Membership in a kind, on the other hand, turns on having the proper similarity to other members of that kind. This fundamental difference gives rise to different explanatory practices. For individuals, we explain both the similarity and variation among the parts of an individual by citing the causal relations among its parts. More concretely, for a taxon, we explain both the similarities and differences among its members by citing its population structure-the relations among those members (Sober, 1980; Ereshefsky and Matthen, 2005) . Explanations concerning the members of kinds are quite different. For kinds, only the similarities among the members of a kind are explained. Consider essentialism and HPC theory. Those accounts cite mechanisms, either essences or homeostatic mechanisms, to explain the similarity among the members of a kind. No heterostatic mechanisms are posited by kind theorists to explain differences among the members of a kind. Variation among the members of a kind is accidental, whereas variation among the parts of an individual is often due to the structure of the individual. For example, the sex ratio found in a species is the result of such factors as inheritance systems and frequency-dependent selection. Theories of kinds (essentialism and HPC theory) are in the business of explaining similarity, not variation, yet variation is a fundamental feature of species and higher taxa. Theories of individuality explain both similarity and variability. Individuals and kinds are very different types of ontological entities. Yet supporters of HPC theory often conflate the two, suggesting that individuals are just a type of kind (Boyd, 1999a:163) or that the distinction between kinds and individuals is "outdated" (Keller et al., 2003:93-94) . To think there is no distinction between kinds and individuals is to conflate two fundamentally different approaches to explanation and taxonomy. Furthermore, as we have seen, Rieppel (2006a) and Keller et al. (2003) equate origin essentialism with qualitative essentialism and attack the thesis that taxa are individuals as a form of essentialism. However, origin essentialism is no more qualitative essentialism than individuals are kinds. In sum, then, Rieppel and Keller et al. have not established that taxa are kinds, nor have they shown that the individuality thesis is based on outdated metaphysics. The meaning of taxon names has been hotly debated in the last 15 years. Supporters of the individuality thesis (Ghiselin, 1974 (Ghiselin, ,1997 Hull, 1976 Hull, ,1978 believe that taxon names should be treated as rigid designators. Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( , 2006a and Nixon and Carpenter (2000) disagree and argue that treating taxon names as rigid designators is a mistake. They also criticize supporters of the PhyloCode for adopting rigid designator theory. Before turning to Rieppel, Nixon, and Carpenter's criticisms, let us look at the background to rigid designator theory.
Rigid designator theory was introduced by Putnam (1970) and Kripke (1972) as a response to the then accepted semantic account of scientific terms, definite description theory. Roughly, definite description theory holds that the meaning of a scientific term is determined by that term's corresponding theory. The meaning of "electron," for example, is set by how that word functions in the appropriate scientific theory. Because the meaning of a scientific term is given by its corresponding theory, changes or disagreement in theory implies that the same term refers to different classes of entities. According to definite description theory, when Thomson and Lorentz used the term "electron" they referred to different clusters of entities given their different theories of electrons. Putnam and Kripke reasoned that there is something wrong with definite description theory, for surely scientists holding different theories can nevertheless talk about the same entities. In biology, Linnaeus, Mayr, and Hennig offered different accounts of species, but arguably they talked about the same kind of entity. If "species" referred to a different type of entity every time a scientist introduced a new account of species, then there would be no scientific progress on the nature of speciesthere would just be multiple theories of species referring to different kinds of entities. Putnam and Kripke believed that the meaning of a scientific term cannot be wedded to its use in a particular theory; otherwise, communication and progress across scientific theories would falter.
As an alternative, Kripke and Putnam suggested that scientific terms are rigid designators. According to rigid designator theory, the meaning of a scientific term is its referent-the entity or group of entities named by the term. The meaning of the term "electron" is the totality of electrons in the world. Following Putnam's (1970) account, a term is introduced via ostension using a stereotype to fix that term to its referent. A stereotype is a putative theory about the entities in question. Stereotype theories include scientific theories and common beliefs about those entities. Consider the history of the term "electron." Stoney introduced "electron" in 1891 using the broad description "natural units of electricity" (Hacking, 1983:83) . Ideas or concepts are necessary to fix a term to a referent, and those ideas are introduced in the stereotype. There is no pure ostension in science in the sense that a scientist merely points with her finger to the scientific entity in question and utters a name for that entity (we will return to this point later). The ideas cited in stereotypes are often incorrect and replaced by others as scientific knowledge advances. In 1897, Thomson refined Stoney's theory of electrons using his atomic theory of electrons. Thomson's theory was subsequently falsified and replaced by Lorentz's theory of electrons. According to rigid designator theor)', the word "electron" referred to the same type of scientific entity despite a change in associated theory. Rigid designator theory allows scientists to talk about the same; entities while improving their theories of those entities through empirical investigation.
Nearly 40 years ago, Hull (1976 Hull ( ,1978 suggested that species names should be treated as rigid designators. One reason, as Rieppel (2005:271; 2006a:187) observes, is that species evolve and change over time. If the meaning of a species name is a definite description that cites a certain set of characteristics, we may find that such a description does not apply to some members of the species. The problem is ontological: species vary and evolve; hence, there is likely no definite description associated with a species for the entire life of that species. There are also epistemological reasons why definite description definitions are problematic for species names, and these reasons are very much in line with Putnam and Kripke's reasons for rejecting definite descriptions. The type specimen, or set of specimens, chosen for a species may not be statistically typical of a species. The problem is epistemological because the information we have about the species via the type specimen does not provide an accurate representation of the species. On the other hand, if we treat a species name as a rigid designator and the description of the type specimen as part of the species' stereotype, no such problem occurs. A species' stereotype consists of the description of the species' type specimen and hypotheses about the species' attributes and contents. We might later learn that those hypotheses are inaccurate as we discover new information about the species. Nevertheless, the species name continues to refer to the same species even though our knowledge of the species changes.
Following Hull, supporters of the PhyloCode Gauthier, 1992,1994; de Queiroz, 1992 de Queiroz, ,1995 suggest an approach to higher taxa names similar to rigid designator theory. De Queiroz and Gauthier's motivation is twofold. First, they believe that taxon names should be defined in terms of phylogenetic relations rather than characters. Second, they want to increase the stability of taxon names such that a taxon name will continue to refer to a taxon despite a change in our knowledge of that taxon's characters, level of inclusiveness, or internal taxa. This second desire is aligned with the primary aim of rigid designator theory: stability in a taxon's name despite a change in knowledge concerning that taxon. According to de Queiroz and Gauthier, a taxon name is attached to a particular taxon in an ostension event using one of several phylogenetic definitions. For example, the name "Z" is fixed to a taxon using the node-based definition "Z" refers to the least inclusive clade containing species A and B. This is very much like Kripke's and Putnam's accounts of rigid designators because "Z" is rigidly attached to a clade by ostension. A phylogenetic definition is akin to the description of a type specimen of a species: both are used to attach a name to a taxon. The stereotype associated with a higher taxon name includes its phylogenetic definition as well as hypotheses concerning the taxon's phylogeny, content, and characters. We may later learn that those hypotheses are incorrect as we discover new information about the taxon. Nevertheless, the taxon name continues to refer to the same taxon even though our knowledge of that taxon has changed. Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( ,2006a and Nixon and Carpenter (2000) launch a number of criticisms of rigid designator theory. Those criticisms attack both rigid designator theory generally and its application to biological nomenclature. Let us start with an argument strategy Rieppel uses in a handful of examples. In each example he suggests that an empirical discovery concerning a taxon implies a change in meaning of that taxon's name. Consider Rieppel's examples involving the discovery of synonymy (Rieppel, 2005:472; 2006a:191) . Suppose two taxon names are mistakenly assigned to two taxa, but in fact those names refer to one taxon. That mistake is discovered years later and the names are then considered synonymous. Rieppel asserts that the recognition that two taxa are in fact one taxon implies that "a change of meaning must have occurred" (2006a: 191) . In Rieppel's example, the taxon itself has not changed, just the meaning of the names. Yet according to rigid designator theory, the meaning of a name is just its referent, so Rieppel concludes that rigid designator theory fails to capture the associated change in meaning. Rieppel offers a variation on this type of example. Suppose an empirical discovery implies that the composition of a taxon is different than previously thought (Rieppel, 2005 (Rieppel, ,2006 . Suppose we first think that Diapsida is part of the more inclusive taxon Reptilia, but later discover that Diapsida is not a part of Reptilia. Our knowledge of Reptilia and Diapsida has changed. Rieppel concludes that this "example shows once again that the meaning of a taxon name is not exhausted by its referent,... but crucially depends on the potentially changing composition of a taxon " (2006a:191) . Change in composition does not imply a change in meaning on rigid designator theory, so again Rieppel concludes that rigid designator theory is inadequate.
Rieppel's examples are not effective counterexamples to rigid designator theory. Rieppel's arguments concerning these examples commit the logical fallacy called begging the question. That fallacy occurs when one attempts to prove a conclusion by either implicitly or explicitly assuming that conclusion. Rieppel wants to derive the conclusion that rigid designator theory is false, but he derives that conclusion by implicitly assuming that rigid designator theory is false. Consider his example where we discover that a taxon has a different composition than previously thought. Rieppel claims that this change in knowledge implies a change in the meaning of the taxon's name. However, to make that claim is to implicitly assume that rigid designator theory is false, for rigid designator theory denies that there is a change in meaning. Recall that for rigid designator theory our knowledge of a taxon can change, yet the meaning of its name, its referent, remains the same. For Rieppel's argument to be effective he needs to give a reason why a change in our knowledge of the composition of a taxon implies a change in the meaning of that taxon's name. Otherwise, Rieppel is merely assuming what he wants to prove. Rieppel's examples only show that he and supporters of rigid designator theory have different intuitions concerning the meanings of taxon names. Rieppel (2005 Rieppel ( , 2006a provides other arguments against rigid designator theory. One such argument, first launched by Nixon and Carpenter (2000) and Keller et al. (2003) , is that the application of rigid designator theory in the PhyloCode renders our use of taxon names insensitive to empirical evidence. For example, Keller et al. (2003:101) write that "De Queiroz and Gauthier's phylogenetic definitions are irrefutable a priori statements." Keller et al. (2003:101) add that such definitions are "analytically true and hence not amenable to revision in light of new knowledge." Nixon and Carpenter (2000:315) write that according to the PhyloCode, "[p] articular clades once named (created) are always true; these clades henceforth always exist" (see also Rieppel, 2006a: 188-190) .
Contrary to such claims, rigid designator theory does not turn biological taxonomy into a nonempirical, a priori project. First, nothing in rigid designator theory forces us to accept the existence of nonexistent entities. Scientists once thought that phlogiston and caloric existed. That is, the original stereotype theories associated with such terms assumed that phlogiston and caloric existed. The current theories associated with phlogiston and caloric assert that phlogiston and caloric do not exist. Similarly, nothing in rigid designator theory forces us to think that nonexistent taxa exist. Suppose a taxon name is applied to a group that we later discover is polyphyletic. We discover that the putative taxon is not a clade and thus nonexistent from a phylogenetic perspective. Because we no longer believe that the taxon exists, we no longer believe that the assigned taxon name refers to that taxon. Nothing in rigid designator theory forces us to remain committed to the existence of a putative taxon that we later find does not exist.
Second, Rieppel and Nixon and Carpenter employ the sort of examples cited earlier concerning synonymy and taxon composition to show that rigid designator theory is insensitive to empirical evidence. In particular, they argue that rigid designator theory renders our use of taxon names insensitive to empirical evidence because, according to that theory, a change in our knowledge of a taxon does not affect the meaning of its name. This charge, however, trades on a confusion over the roles of semantics and epistemology in rigid designator theory. Consider Rieppel's example of discovered synonymy. We learn that two taxon names refer to the same taxon. Rigid designator theory does not deny that we have learned something, namely that two taxon names refer to the same taxon. It does not preclude us from using that knowledge when we discuss those names or classify their associated taxa. Rigid designator theory merely denies that the referent of a scientific term, the entity itself, changes because we have attained new knowledge about it. The virtue of rigid designator theory is that it allows us to talk about one and the same entity as our scientific knowledge of that entity progresses.
Another set of criticisms Rieppel (2006a) and Nixon and Carpenter (2000) offer against rigid designator theory involves the process of ostension. For example, Rieppel (2006a) writes that mere ostension-the mere utterance of a term and pointing to a type specimen-is not sufficient to fix a term to a referent. This is quite right. As mentioned earlier, concepts are involved in every instance of ostension in science. For example, the ostension of a taxon name involves such basic concepts as the notion of being a single organism (the type specimen) and the concept of being a monophyletic taxon. Ostension in science turns on robust background theories and assumptions; this is no news for rigid designator theory for it is part of rigid designator theory. A different kind of concern raised by Nixon and Carpenter (2000:310) is what they call "Accuracy in Pointing." Often the initial theoretical assumptions concerning a named entity are found to be incorrect. Using the example of "Mammals," Nixon and Carpenter (2000) suggest that when the corresponding taxon was first named, we thought that the taxon contained Multituberculates. We now know it does not. Nixon and Carpenter (2000:310) conclude, " [t] he simple example of the case (e.g., the Mammals) in which an internal rearrangement within a clade results in the necessity for the name to be applied to a different (sub-)clade shows that this method of pointing is, simply put, inaccurate." They are right: ostension can be inaccurate, but rigid designator theory proponents are fully aware of this. That is why they believe that the theories used during ostension, indeed during any stage of scientific investigation, are provisional. This just echoes an underlying motivation for rigid designator theory, namely that the theories concerning scientific entities change and progress.
Notice that the sort of inaccuracies that occur in ostension occur in any approach to nomenclature. The PhyloCode approach to ostension may result in inaccuracies concerning the internal taxa of a taxon. Inaccuracies can also occur in the naming procedures advocated by Nixon and Carpenter (2000) and Rieppel (2006a) . Nixon and Carpenter suggest fixing a name to a taxon by using a list of synapomorphies. Rieppel suggests using "relational properties that are homologies" to tie names to taxa (2006a:195) . In either case, we can be wrong about the set of characters or properties used to define a name. Perhaps some of the original putative synapomorphies used to fix a name to taxon prove on further analysis not to be synapomorphies. It is common to learn that a putative homology is in fact a homoplasy. Fixing a name to a taxon via a taxonomic hypothesis, whether that hypothesis mentions descendents or homologies, can be inaccurate. Such inaccuracies are not limited to rigid designator theory but are the result of a general fact about scientific practice: scientists are not omniscient, so scientists often revise their initial theories concerning scientific entities.
Stepping back from these details, I suspect that the substantive complaint detractors of rigid designator theory have with the PhyloCode has less to do with general philosophical issues and more to do with disagreements internal to biological systematics. In their criticisms of rigid designator theory and its application to biological taxonomy, Rieppel, Keller et al, and Nixon and Carpenter often focus on what Rieppel (2006a) calls "foundational" issues. They charge supporters of rigid designator theory and the PhyloCode with adopting essentialism, being logically inconsistent, and making taxonomy untestable. As we have seen, these philosophical charges are unsound. Nevertheless, there are important disagreements between supporters and detractors of rigid designator theory and the PhyloCode. For one, they disagree on what type of stability should be preferred in taxonomy. For Nixon and Carpenter (2000:306) , "[stability is measured... as the net change in terms of terminals originally included in a group compared to the group as defined on a new tree." Supporters of the PhyloCode, on the other hand, prefer keeping a taxon's ancestry stable (de Queiroz, 1995; Lee, 1996) . Another disagreement concerns the types of features used for fixing a name to a taxon. Nixon and Carpenter and Rieppel prefer using putative synapomorphies and homologies. Supporters of the PhyloCode prefer citing putative phylogenetic relations. These differences have more to do with assumptions concerning the nature of taxa and the types of evidence used for positing taxa than issues in the philosophy of science. Consequently, philosophical criticisms of rigid designator theory and its application to biological nomenclature do not address the substantive differences between supporters and detractors of the PhyloCode.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper is not to defend a particular school of nomenclature but to address some recent arguments concerning the philosophical foundations of taxonomy. Many biologists have adopted Ghiselin and Hull's suggestions that species and higher taxa are individuals and that taxon names are rigid designators. Rieppel, Keller et al., and Nixon and Carpenter argue that we should drop the individuality thesis and return to the idea that species and higher taxa are kinds. They charge supporters of the individuality thesis with unwittingly adopting essentialism and committing logical inconsistencies. We have seen that such charges do not stick. Moreover, we have seen that the account of kinds adopted by Rieppel and Keller et al., homeostatic property cluster theory, emphasizes similarity over phylogeny, rendering homeostatic property cluster theory an inappropriate approach to species and higher taxa. Turning to taxon names, we have seen a number of philosophical charges against rigid designator theory and its application to taxon names. These arguments often turn on misconceptions of rigid designator theory. Furthermore, such philosophical criticisms do not address the more substantive differences between supporters and detractors of rigid designator theory such as the nature of taxa and the evidence used for positing taxa. This is not to say that the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory are perfect. No philosophical or systematic theory is perfect. The philosopher Lakatos (1970) recognized that all theories have their flaws and suggested that we should prefer one theory over another when it is more progressive. Part of that progress is theoretical progress, namely when a theory leads to new theoretical insights and theory development. The individuality thesis has been a fruitful catalyst for systematic theorizing (Eldredge, 1985; Cracraft, 1987; Gould, 2002) . Rigid designator theory has been successfully applied across scientific disciplines, from chemistry to physics to biology. Though the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory may not be perfect, they have stimulated positive theoretical work in systematics and nomenclature. The individuality thesis and rigid designator theory should not be quickly abandoned.
